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Abstract
Recent work in experimental economics has raised that observed behavior depends on whether wealth
was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth aﬀects
bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We ﬁnd people bid more sincerely in the
auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding
in hypothetical auctions.
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1 Introduction
There has been a push in experimental economics to replace windfall wealth with earned wealth. Legit-
imize wealth with eﬀort has been shown to aﬀect people's behavior in experiments, especially in games
involving social preferences (i.e., self-interested people who also think about the payoﬀs and intentions of
others). For example, people who earned their wealth were less generous in games that involve resource
sharing, e.g., the dictator game.
Evidence suggests people are less generous and less prone to take risks when spending their own
money (see Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren,
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2005).1 The open question is whether earned wealth helps concentrate the mind on being more rational
or whether it simply reduces one's social preferences or both.
Herein we explore this question by examining whether earned wealth will aﬀect bidding behavior
in Vickrey (1961)'s classic demand-revealing second price auction. The second price auction is a good
case study on the origins of wealth because earlier experiments have observed risk taking and insincere
bidding behavior given windfall wealth (see the review by Kagel, 1995). Also the auction provides a
cleaner environment since it involves only private values; there is no mechanism to share wealth, which
eliminates social preferences from the story since a bidders' behavior is independent of the distribution
and behavior of the other players.
Our results suggest earned money matters in the auction mechanism, and in a particular way. Bidding
behavior was more demand-revealing and eﬃciency was signiﬁcantly greater for earned wealth relative
to windfall treatments. But this only held when monetary incentives also existed; earned wealth had
the opposite eﬀect on bidding behavior when the auction was non-binding.
2 The experiment
We use a 2×2 factorial design that focuses on two factors that aﬀect the external validity of experimental
decisions: earned versus windfall wealth and monetary versus hypothetical bidding in a second-price auc-
tion. Vickrey is the classic demand revealing auction to use in an experiment given it is straightforward
to explain, the weakly dominant strategy is to bid one's value, and the price is endogenously determined
by the bidders (Kagel, 1995). In all treatments in each period, one unit of an unspeciﬁed good is sold
on the auction. Exchange rules of the second-price auction are: the highest bidder wins and pays the
second-highest bidder's bid. An auction has 9 bidders each endowed with a unique induced value  i.e.
the price at which the bidder can sell the good to the monitor after the auction.
The induced demand curve is identical in all auctions and is deﬁned by: {84; 76; 71; 68; 65; 63; 53; 38; 24}.
All monetary values are expressed in ecu (Experimental Currency Unit). The auction is repeated over 9
periods, implementing all possible permutations between individual private values. Each bidder experi-
ences each private value once; and the entire demand curve is induced in every period.2 Bidders do not
know the other bidders' induced value or the induced demand curve. A bidding period ends when every
bidder has chosen a bid between 0 and 100. At the end of the period, each bidder is privately informed
about whether he or she won the auction (and the market clearing price if they won), their gain for the
period and whether a new auction round is about to start.
All four treatments followed the same design except for the origin of the wealth and the consequences
of bidding. First, the windfall-hypothetical treatment (labeled wh) is our baseline. The windfall
wealth is a show-up fee of 10e . Second, in the Monetary incentives only treatment (wm), bidding
is now binding: auction earnings are translated into Euros given a common knowledge exchange rate
1In contrast, some researchers ﬁnd evidence that the origin of assets does not inﬂuence subject behavior in laboratory
settings (e.g. Clark, 1998, 2002; Rutström and Williams, 2000). But see Harrison (2007) for an alternative interpretation
of Clark's (2002) data.
2Although the repetition is deterministic, we avoid end-game eﬀect by providing the subjects with no information on
that point  except for the repetition itself.
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(3 ecu for 1 e ).3 In each round, the winning bidder's proﬁts equal the diﬀerence between his or her
induced value and the market price he or she pays for the good (the second highest bid). Proﬁts of the
8 non-winning bidders are zero. Only the winner sees the two highest bids at the end of the round.
Overall earnings of the subjects are computed as the sum of the resulting amount and the 10e show-up
fee.
Third, we create the earned-wealth only treatment by adding an intermediate step to the baseline.
Following Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002); Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren (2005), in earned wealth-
only (eh) subjects earned their wealth by answering 20 questions of general interest. Each question
is presented sequentially, and each question has four possible answers among which one is correct.
Monetary earnings are proportional to correct answers. We selected the questions from the sheets used
by the French government to select some of its civil servants. This seems well suited to discriminate
between undergraduate students, since participation to the selection process is open only to holders of
the French baccalaureate.4 Subjects learn their score and total earnings in ecu at the end of this stage.
The payment rate is 2 ecu per correct answer (the exchange rate is again 3 ecu for 1 e ). Once all
subjects answer all questions, the Vickrey auction begins.
The ﬁnal treatment combines Monetary incentives with earned wealth (em). Bidding behavior
is now binding. The four experimental sessions were run in Paris, each involving 18 subjects.5 In
each session, subjects are separated into two distinct 9-bidder auctions, which provides two sessions
for each treatment. Participants were ﬁrst to third-year undergraduate students in law, economics or
chemistry. The experiment was computerized using a software developed under Regate (Zeiliger, 2000),
recruitment made use of orsee (Greiner, 2004).
3 Results
We consider four indicators of sincere bidding behavior across the four treatments  aggregate bidding
and demand, individual bidding behavior, allocative eﬃciency, and surplus extracted.
First, we consider aggregate bidding behavior. Table 1 illustrates bidding behavior at the aggregate
level by induced value and treatment. We add up the bids and sort by induced value for each of the
treatments.
Under windfall wealth, we observe similar bidding behavior with and without monetary incentives,
e.g., no hypothetical bias in bidding. Strictly rational bidding in the monetary and hypothetical treat-
ments would result in the elicitation of 9756 ECU = 542 × 18. Adding up the bids for each induced
value, we see people tend to overbid, both with and without monetary incentives, 10328 ECU(105.9%
of the total demand) and 10134 ECU (103.9%). Unconditional mean test shows that bidding behavior
with or without monetary incentives are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.645).
3Negative total earnings would decrease the show up fee up to 5e . This lower bound stems from the way participants
are recruited: we contractually commit ourselves to a minimum earning equal to 5e .
4The procedure is labeled Concours de Catégorie B de la fonction publique. Our source is http://pagesperso-orange.
fr/bac-es/qcm/annales_c02_r01.html.
5The two windfall sessions are taken from the original experimental plan of Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren
(2008a). The two earned money sessions are the ﬁrst two parts of a longer experiment described in Jacquemet, Joule,
Luchini, and Shogren (2008b).
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Table 1: Aggregate bidding behavior by group and induced value
Induced value 24 38 53 63 65 68 71 76 84 All
Ag. Demand (AD) 432 684 954 1134 1170 1224 1278 1368 1512 9756
Winfall wealth & Hypothetical
Revealed AD 626.0 808.0 1050.0 1193.0 1201.0 1192.0 1242.0 1290.0 1532.0 10134
Ratio RAD/AD 144.9% 118.1% 110.1% 105.2% 102.6% 97.4% 97.2% 94.3% 101.3% 103.9%
Monetary incentives only
Revealed AD 687.0 735.0 1078.0 1045.0 1318.0 1259.0 1281.0 1334.0 1591.0 10328
Ratio RAD/AD 159.0% 107.5% 113.0% 92.2% 112.6% 102.9% 100.2% 97.5% 105.2% 105.9%
Earned wealth only
Revealed AD 670.0 746.0 1045.0 1215.0 1205.0 1348.0 1334.0 1453.0 1479.0 10495
Ratio RAD/AD 155.1% 109.1% 109.5% 107.1% 103.0% 110.1% 104.4% 106.2% 97.8% 107.6%
Earned wealth & Monetary incentive
Revealed AD 492.0 678.0 816.0 1145.0 1121.0 1229.0 1260.0 1406.0 1490.0 9637
Ratio RAD/AD 113.9% 99.1% 85.5% 101.0% 95.8% 100.4% 98.6% 102.8% 98.5% 98.8%
Note. The ﬁrst row reports the induced values attributed to buyers. The second row reports the corresponding aggregate demand
in each treatment, i.e. induced values × number of subjects. For each treatment (four remaining rows), the upper part of the
row displays the aggregate revealed demand (i.e. the observed bids posted by buyers the induced value of whom are reported in
column). The bottom part reports the ratio of this revealed demand to the aggregate induced demand, in %.
A diﬀerent story emerges for the earned wealth treatments. Our results suggest signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in bidding behavior with and without monetary incentives. Elicited demand reveals underbidding,
9637 ECU (98.8%), with monetary incentives; and overbidding at 10495 (107.6%) without monetary
incentives. The diﬀerence in demand is statistically signiﬁcant, p-value p = .046 (unconditional mean
test).
Consider now each induced value in Table 1: it suggests bidding behavior under earned wealth
with monetary incentives performed relatively well at revealing demand in the aggregate. Results show
elicited demand matched the induced demand for all the induced values. Sincere bidding on aggregate
was similar for the other three treatments, except for the oﬀ-margin lowest induced value (24 ECU) in
which bids were more likely to exceed induced demand.
Second, we now examine the rationality assumption of perfect demand revealing bids. If each bidder
maximizes his or her private payoﬀ, each bid should equal the induced value. In wh, 16.7% of bids
are perfectly revealing; 46.9% of bids were within a 10 percent interval of the induced value. Insincere
bidders both inﬂated and shave bids: 29.6% and 23.5%. Under wm, 5.5% of the bids are perfectly
revealing and 52.5% are in the 10 percent interval. Bidders tended to inﬂate their bids (33.3%) rather
than shaving them (14.2%).
Under eh, 8.7% of the bidders bid sincerely and 43.8% were bidding within the 10 percent interval.
Here again, insincere bidders inﬂated their bids (38.9%) rather than shaved their bids (17.3%). Under
em, 20.4% of bidders gave their induced value and 63.6% bidded within the 10 percent interval. Bidders
equally inﬂated and shaved their bids: 18.5% and 17.9%.
We test the assumption of perfect revealing bids by computing the ratio between the bid and the
induced value for each bidder. Rational sincere bidding implies a ratio of one, which is tested by an
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equality test on the estimated intercept of the regression on a constant. We cannot reject the null
of rational bidding behavior for em (p = 0.812); in all other treatments, we do reject the null: wh
(p = 0.034), wm (p = 0.039), and eh (p = 0.010). On average, earned money increased the likelihood
that a bidder would bid sincerely but only with monetary incentives in place; it had the opposite eﬀect
when bids were not binding.
Third, now consider allocative eﬃciency  a second criterion of a well functioning auction. The
auction should allocate the good to the person who values it the most and he or she should pay the
second highest bid. We see the highest value bidder (with induced value of 84 ECU) won the auction
the most frequently in em : 61.1% of the auctions. This was greater than the other three treatments:
wh, 44.4% (p = .504); wm, 50.0% (p = .774); and eh, 22.2% (p = .043).
Strict eﬃciency implies the winner pays the second highest induced value. No treatment was par-
ticularly successful in this level of precision: 0% for both windfall wealth treatments ; 5.5% for earned
wealth treatments. A weaker test is if the winner pays a price within the 10 percent interval around this
value. Here, em now performs signiﬁcantly better than the other treatments: 72.2% of all exchanges.
This compares to 27.8% for wh (p = .020), 33.3% for wm (p = .045) and 38.9% for eh (p = .094).
Finally, we examine average surplus extracted by bidders. A rational bidder would extract 8 ECU
after 9 periods (84ecu - 76ecu). Again em performed signiﬁcantly better than the other treatments:
the average bidders broke about even with a surplus of -0.3ecu. The other treatments all resulted in
a substantial negative surplus signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that in em : -13.4ecu for wh (p = .073),
-14.3ecu for wm (p = 0.04), and -23.4 for eh (p = 0.004).
Overall, based on our four indicators of sincere auction bidding, the most eﬀective treatment was
with earned wealth and monetary incentives  the auction environment closest to the wilds. Earning
money and spending it for real seemed to concentrate the mind on the task at hand, which in our case
was bidding one's induced value in the second-price auction.
4 Concluding remarks
As noted by Bellman nearly ﬁfty years ago: in the physical world, in connection with testing and
experimentation, it is often useful to conceive of nature, in some vague anthropomorphic fashion, as
an opponent attempting to conceal the truth from us. The design of experiments may be conceived of
as a game in which we attempt to extract information from a stubborn, but fair, opponent (Bellman,
1957, p.283). Herein we ﬁnd that earned wealth matters in our experimental private value second-price
auction. Earned wealth with monetary incentives induced more sincere bidding and greater eﬃciency
relative to the classic windfall wealth treatment; and relative to the hypothetical bidding employed in
stated preference valuation surveys. Since our design did not allow social preferences to play a role in
behavior, earned wealth seemed to help concentrate the mind on the task at hand  rational bidding. In
that sense, our results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that variations in incentives even out of the equilibrium
path does in fact change behavior (Georganas, Levin, and McGee, 2009).
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